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  Introduction
The topic of this talk will be the lasting interest of LEJ Brouwers notion
of choice sequence for the philosophy of mathematics In the past here has
been done a good deal of work on choice sequences but in the last decade the
subject is a bit out of fashion for several reasons which I shall not go into
here In this retrospective I want to take a look with you at a special aspect
of choice sequences namely their interest as an important casestudy in the
philosophy of mathematics
How does mathematics arrive at its concepts and discover the principles
holding for those concepts This is a typically philosophical question more
easily posed than answered A procedure which certainly has played a role and
still plays a role might be described as
informally rigorous analysis of a concept
That is to say
  given an informally described but intuitively clear concept
  one analyzes the concept as carefully as possible and attempts to formulate
formally precise principles characterizing the concept
This is full of vague words such as intuitively clear informal rigorous
etc Instead of plunging myself deeper into the morass of vagueness and im	
precision by trying to explain in general terms what I mean by these words I
shall give some examples below
But before doing this let me point out that usually an informal concept
serving as basis for such an analysis is not found in nature but suggests itself
on the basis of a good deal of mathematical experience only
Also it is good to point out that many mathematicians in the course of their
work are never called upon to make such a concept analysis since there is always
a vast amount of work to be done based on sharply delimited wellunderstood
mathematical notions Nevertheless the study of mathematicalconcept anal	
ysis is of obvious interest for the philosophy and history of mathematics


 Examples
  Example  The notion of natural number formally characterized by in	
duction Natural numbers are historically at the basis of mathematics the
analysis of the concept culminated in the work of Dedekind and Peano
formally characterizing them by the validity of induction in full generality
  Example  The  denition of continuity of functions may be obtained
by reecting on the idea of a smooth curve a curve which makes no
jumps
  Example  The notion of area for a wide class of pointsets in the plane A
few intuitively obvious properties for the notion of area lead to a complete
and unique characterization Area  should conform to the standard
euclidean denition of the area of a rectangle should be additive monotone
and take only positive values
  Example  The notion of humanly computable function or algorithm has
been analyzed by Turing and leads to the mathematically precise notion of
a recursive function  Turingcomputable function denable function
etc A similar analyis is possible of the notion of mechanically computable
function leading to the same formal concept
  Example  The notions of a random sequence and independency of random
sequences An analysis in our sense not completely satisfactory of this
concept has been carried out by the probability theorist R von Mises in
recent years M van Lambalgen has published on this   I shall not
discuss any details here since this would certainly carry us too far Van
Lambalgen argues that even if we can develop probability theory on an ax	
iomatic basis starting from the notion of a probability measure instead of
starting from the notion of random sequence we still have to face the ques	
tion what is a random sequence when confronted with the applications
of probability theory
This example shows some similarities with our next and nal example
  Example  Choice sequences The details of this example will follow later
For contrast I shall also briey discuss a nonexample the notion of set as
it gures in the modern practice of axiomatic set theory Basis for my discussion
are two papers by Penelope Maddy  
 andMichael Halletts book

The justications for axioms of set theory are of two kinds in Maddys ter	
minology intrinsic and extrinsic ones The intrinsic arguments argue from
the intuitive understanding of the concept of set the extrinsic pragmatic
heuristic arguments are based on eg the desirability of certain mathemat	
ical consequences intertheoretic consequences explanatory power In the use
of extrinsic justications there is an analogy with the natural sciences experi	
menting with the consequences helps us to choose the right axioms Extrinsic
arguments are brought forward not only for fancy axioms stating the existence
of certain very large cardinals but also for the basic axioms of the wellknown
ZermeloFraenkel axiomatization This happens even for an axiom looking so


uncontroversial as the extensionality axiom most authors regard it as intrin	
sically justied but some give also extrinsic reasons the extensional notion of
set is simpler clearer and more convenient than its nonextensional inten	
sional counterpart sets as properties
Several authors have attempted to justify the ZermeloFraenkel axioms by
analyzing the intuitive picture of the cumulative hierarchy As shown convinc	
ingly by Hallett in his book Cantorian set theory and limitiation of size and
Maddy many diculties are glossed over in these intrinsic justications and
all in all these attempts at concept analysis remain thoroughly unconvincing
From the examples and the nonexample above it will be clear that on
the one hand concept analysis has played and may be expected to continue
playing an important role in the development of mathematics but on the other
hand that it is by no means the only way of introducing new concepts
 Choice sequences
Choice sequences were introduced by LEJ Brouwer around 

 in order to
give an intuitively more satisfactory account than hitherto of the continuum in
the context of his intuitionistic mathematics 
 Before that time Brouwer
just like the french empiristes such as E Borel had viewed the continuum as
a primitive concept which could not be understood as the set of its elements
The introduction of choice sequences restored this possibility of having an
arithmetic theory of the continuum in contemporary terminology
A very interesting aspect of Brouwers notion was that choice sequences
when taken seriously as mathematical objects enforced the use of intuitionis	
tic logic since some of the principles valid for choice sequences contradicted
classical logic Thus they provided an alternative mathematical universe with
a deviant logic Nowadays this is commonplace in particular in topos theory
but it was certainly not commonplace in Brouwers time
A choice sequence in Brouwers sense is a sequence of natural numbers to
keep it simple which is not a priori given by a law or recipe for the elements
but which is created step by step by the ideal mathematician anyone of us
may serve as an approximation of the ideal mathematician the process will
go on indenitely but is never nished Brouwers discovery was that one
could use such unnished objects in a meaningful way in intuitionistic
mathematics It is not the individual choice sequence which matters but the
principles which hold for all of them Since continuous operations on sequences
can be carried out by operating on initial segments choice sequences are closed
under continuous operations
The subjective element in the construction of choice sequences the conict
with classical logic and Brouwers littleunderstood argument for the socalled
bar theorem all tended to make choice sequences look mysterious or dubious
Errett Bishop even talked of mumbojumbo
People reacted in dierent ways Some rejected intuitionism wholesale
Others preferred developing constructive mathematics without choice sequences


AA Markov E Bishop Logicians such as SC Kleene  encoded the
mathematical practice involving choice sequences and gave a relative consis	
tency proof relative to a system in the intersection of intuitionistic and classical
mathematics
Over the years Brouwer repeatedly indicated how one should think of the
individual choice sequence but his detailed views seemed to oscillate
Some intuitionists are of the opinion that further analysis of the individ	
ual choice sequence is unneccessary nay even impossible  there is a single
concept and no room for meaningful subuniverses   I follow here
another analytical approach which highlights the intensional aspects of
choice sequences
A property of sequences or an operation on sequences is said to be exten	
sional if it only depends on the courseofvalues of the sequence that is to
say for operations  and properties P 
 xx  x      and  xx  x P  P 
In this talk intensional properties are simply nonextensional properties
For example suppose we consider sequences given by algorithms The op	
eration which assigns to a sequence its algorithm is nonextensional Usually
this introduction of nonextensionality is avoided by talking about the algo	
rithms themselves instead of the sequences But this way of avoiding non
extensionality is not feasible in the case of choice sequences
On the analytical approach we try to analyze what it means to say that a
choice sequence is given and what it means to assert that something holds for
all choice sequences An algorithmic sequence is obviously given by describing
the algorithm but how is a choice sequence given
I shall endeavour to illustrate the analytical approach by one example for a
rather extreme variant of choice sequence the so	called lawless sequences 

chapter 
 
Informally we think of a lawless sequence of natural numbers as a process of
choosing values in N started by the ideal mathematician in the mind of which
in Brouwers view all mathematics is constructed the process is started under
the a priori restriction that
  at any stage of the construction never more than an initial segment has
been determined and that no restrictions have been imposed on future
choices
  there is a commitment to determine more and more values so the sequence
is innite
If we reect on these stipulations the following principle seems to be evident
The principle of open data
If P is a property of lawless sequences 
  will be used for lawless se	
quences and P  then there is an initial segment n  h     n

i such that


 n  n P  or   mnm  m P
The reason is that if we can assert at some stage in our activity P  for
a lawless sequence  then the basis for our assertion can only be an initial
segment of  and therefore any lawless sequence starting with the same initial
segment ought to have the same property
A lawless sequence may be compared to the sequence of casts of a die There
too at any given stage in the generation of the sequence never more than an
initial segment is known But in discussing random sequences we are usually
interested in another notion of truth instead of absolute truth we have true
with probability 
 A random sequence of zeros and ones contains a zero
with probability one but there is no absolute certainty that we will encounter
a one before this actually happens
All this is very nice but what can we say about the existence of lawless
sequences Certainly we can assume that we can start creating some lawless
sequences even as many as we like but some experimenting soon reveals that
hat we need to get a mathematical theory at all is that all possible initial
segments occur
Density principle
For each initial segment there is a lawless sequence starting with that
segment
In order to guarantee this we have to modify our notion of lawless sequence
a little at the start when generating a lawless sequence we permit the stipu	
lation of a nite initial segment in advance After that things go on as before
In the model of the casts of a die this would amount to permitting initially
a number of deliberate placings of the die
However this modication of our notion weakens the justication for the
principle of open data After this modication it may happen that for two
lawless sequences   at some stage the same initial segment may have been
determined while nevertheless there is a piece of information about these se	
quences which cannot be read o from these initial segments alone namely
which parts of these initial segments had been xed at the start So we may
initially stipulate that  begins with 
 and  with 
 but in a later stage
for both sequences we know the initial segment 
 and nothing more
One may well feel that we do not want to distinguish mathematically between
these two situations at later stages or in other words these dierences should
not enter in the properties of sequences we are interested in In short we want
to abstract from these distinctions If we do we expect open data to hold
In this way several mor eprinciples may be formulated which yield a formally
consistent nonclassical theory which up to a point completely characterizes
lawless sequences
In this example mathematical desiderata led us to introduce a complication
into the intuitive picture and to weaken the link between the informal concept


and the formal principles obtained by analyzing the concept We have weakened
the intuitive basis in order to gain in mathematical manageability
Of course this happens elsewhere too Time and again objections have been
raised against unrestricted induction over the natural numbers since natural
numbers as usually treated are not conceptually uniform our grasp of a
small number like  is vastly dierent from our understanding of say 
 
 

The latter presupposes the understanding of exponentiation as an everywhere
dened operation on the natural numbers In practice we treat  and 
 
 
as essentially the same ie we forget about abstract from the intuitive
dierences This is an abstraction with powerful consequences the diculties
encountered in the various attempts to take these dierences seriously show how
essential the role of this kind of abstraction is To some extent the distinction
is taken into account in bounded arithmetic but this undeniably interesting
theory is mathematically much more complicated than ordinary arithmetic
Similarly certain intuitionists adopt a holistic view of the continuum and
maintain that is neither desirable nor possible even to distinguish subdomains
such as the lawless sequences  
However if one does distinguish subdomains according to how precisely a
sequence is given there is a wealth of possibilities giving rise to consistent and
interesting formalisms From a mathematical point of view the main problem
is to discover which notions lead to a nice theory
We mention two possibilities more or less at random
A Instead of stipulating as for lawless sequences that at every stage
future choices are completely unrestricted we now permit at any stage either
to leave future choices completely free or to restrict henceforth choices to a
law denite recipe at least if this option has not already earlier been chosen
B We permit at any stage restriction of the continuation of the sequence to
lie with a denite ie not depending on choice parameters tree of possibilities
later restrictions should be compatible with the restrictions chosen before As
an extreme case the choices may be narrowed down to a law as a singlebranch
tree
Lack of time prevents me from discussing the properties of the sequences
in these examples  not in themselves important  therefore I only mention
the result of the analysis A and B have quite distinct properties which
distinguish them from each other and from the lawless sequences
But I hope this suces to show that choice sequences provides very inter	
esting examples for experimentation with concept analysis perhaps precisely
because these examples are far less familiar to us than say area or contin	
uous function
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